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Suggested by "Our Judicial Oligarchy," by Gilbert E. Roe, with
Introduction by Robert M. La Follette, New York,
B. W. Huebsch, 1912.
By Theodore Schroeder of the New York Bar.
This book is a most thoughtful and important part of current
literature devoted to the criticism of our judiciary. That, by
usurped power, our courts have established a "judicial
Oligarchy," Mr. Roe tries to prove, in part, by pointing to the
judicial practice of declaring legislation unconstitutional, and the
class conscious manner in which that power has been exercised.
Some of the critics of our courts assert positively, that ours are
the only courts in history that ever assume to annul State or
national - statutes. 'r. Roe implies that such a power for
annulling acts of Parliament is unknown to the English judicial
system. I deem it desirable that this assumption and the other
more positive statement shall not go unchallenged, lest persist-
ance of reiteration shall pervert history, and create in the public
mind some unwarranted predisposition.
"Magna Charta (Chap. 29) declares that Right and Justice
shall not be sold, nor denied, nor delayed to any man. Also. *that
touching 'the free liberties and free Customs' of the people.
'neither the King, nor his heirs, shall procure or do anything
whereby they shall be infringed or broken; and if anything be
procured by any person, contrary to the premises, it shall be had
of no force or cffect." This Charter having been confirmed by
Two and Thirty acts of Parliament, all these are consequently
alike declaratory of fundamentals."'
Many times, before the American Revolution, have law-writers
and enactments of Parliament declared that laws and judgments
which contravened the Great Charter were a nullity." Review-
1 Cartwright's, The English Constitution Produced and llustrated, 1).
133, Ed. 1823.
2 25th Edward 1. Stat, 1, Cap. 2; 34th Edward I. Stat. 4, Cap. 4: 25th
Edward III. Stat. 5, Cap. 4; 42d Edward Il., Cap. 1; 3d Henry IV.. Stat.
2; 2d Henry VII., Cap. 1; 1st Henry IV.
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ing and summarizing these athorities, John Cartwright expresses
himself thus:
"From the foregoing premises, this conclusion is invitabe-
that there is a legal, just, and peaceable resistance tO unconstitu-
tioVnal Statutes, and illegally-exercised powers, incumbent on all
men to make, and which, for the public good and public peace,
weire best made by the P eopl when serving on juries for the
enforpement of all jqst Law!s, aided by the Justices on the Bench
?as in the noble instances of U7ray gand yer in the time of Eliza-
"It being the offie of the ing' Just ces--not jus darp, but
jus direre, or in English-npt to mqk but to declare the law; it
follows that, when a penal sta ute is doubtful or equjioaal, the
Justices on the B ph are not to intgrprgt, wvhich in that case is
efquivalent to mgaip!g the Law, but, in conjunctiqon wvith the Jury,
to s uspend the gtqrcgment, and refer it back to the Legislature,
whyo alone, in §such a ,cse, are competent to 'amend and explain'
their @wn imperfect, doubtful, or equ i tca Act. This cours@
is emphatically pointed out and enjgii1@4 by the i~th Edwuard
, ca p. 8, in which it is declared and enacted, that fDefault.s shall
be presented to the Justices assigned, and after, by them to the
~ing, and the King will provide rerndy, that is, through the
medium of the Legislature; for in the Norma-aught dialect, it
is the King who is said to make the laws, although forsooth 'with
the dvice and consent' of the Legislattre. What defaults can
be s@ preqjdi-ial tp the public, as !aw§ liable to m isinterpreta-
tiofl ,,
Qut of such considerations arose the Ancient axim i'Ubi ju.
;ciertprm ii iu.. u n rmn.' i Lord Auclapo, in 177i, exhibited the
qpplication of this maxim in the following language; "'Under
the act 14 Geo. ii. c. 6, stealing sheep 'or other cattle' was made
felony without benefit of clergy; but thse general words for
qother pattle' being pqsidered as too vague to preate a capital
offense, the act yas properly holden to ¢tpnd only to sheep."
Our American courts have many times held statutes to be uncon-
3 The English Constitution Produced and Illustrated, p. 136.
4 Where the law is uncertain there is no law.
Principles of Penal Law, pp. 312-314.
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stitutional for uncertainty in the criteria of guilt and as appears
from the above citations they could have found plenty of prerevo-
lutionary precedent for doing so.
I resume my quotations from Cartwright and append his foot
notes. "Against the Law of Reason, or against Justice, there is
no prescription, or opposed Statute, or Custom; but if any such
be made, they be not Statutes nor Customs, but Corruptions. 7
Corruptions are things voids and against Justice.8 Statutes can-
not exist either against Reason, or the Law Divine.9  Laws
incompatible with the Constitution are in themselves void.10
Whatever the Legislature doth shall be holden for nought, when-
ever it shall enact that which is contrary to the Rights of Nature,
or the. principles of the Constitution." When the Legislative
power exceeds its limits, its act is no more, as to right and author-
ity, than the act of a private society against the will of the Com-
munity.12  Although four Acts of Parliament had passed, that
persons charged with treason in Ireland might be tried in England,
yet when attempted in the reign of Elizabeth, it was declared by
Wray and Dyer, Justices, with the entire concurrence of Gerrarde,
Attorney-General, that those Acts being contrary to the Consti-
tution, were not Law, and therefore could not be carried into
execution. 13  Emnpson and Dudley, who had pillaged the people
under an Act of Parliament made for filling the Exchequer, were,
for so doing, in the end, hanged as felons; because the pretended
Statute (ii Henry VII., Chap. 15) which they had put in force,
was contrary to the Constitution, and subversive (as Sir Edward
Coke observed) of 'the Birth-right of the Subject'; and conse-
quently it was a corruption which, when brought to the test, was
to be 'holden for nought'.
"There not having existed in time past any correct and author-
ized Definition of the English Constitution, which might serve
6 See cases review in Chapters 18-21 of "Obscene Literature and Con-
stitutional Law"; also, Czarra v. Medical Sup., 25 App. Cases, D. C., 443;
United States v. Capital Traction Co., 34 App. Cases, D. C., 592.
'Doctor and Student, Cap. ii, p. 5 and 6, 17th Ed., by Muchall, 1787.
s 1b. Edition of 1663, p. 5.
9 Doctor and Student, 17th Edition by Muchall, 1787, Chap. 10.
10 Loft's Elements of Universal Law, 291.
11 Proeme to Vol. 2, Coke's Institutes of the Laws of England;
Sharp's, Declaration of People's Rights, 236, Lond. 1774.
12 Loft's, Elements of Universal Law, 173.
13 Sharp's, Declaration of People's Rights, 193, Lond. 1774.
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as a criterion for distinguishing between those Laws that, as
fundamental, were unchangeable; and those which were mere
rules of temporary expedience, liable to change with circum-
stances, and therefore alterable; Lawyers and Statesmen had
perhaps no better way to express themselves than as they did,
when the declared object was, to secure 'Rights and Liberties';
vet it is obvious that on those occasions they intended to speak
of what was unchangeable, although using the ambiguous word
Law; for it cannot be supposed they put Rights and Liberties on
a level with Ale-houses or Bawdy-houses, Calves or Cabbage,
Witches or Enchantments, Kettles or Frying-pans, the Apparel
of a ploughman or the Velvet Cap of a Knight; all which and the
like, ten thousand times told, were the subject of Law. The
Bill of Rights and Liberties, that was passed for consolidating
the Revolution of 1688, which expelled a King on account chiefly
of having snspended wholesome Laws in support of Rights and
Liberties, if not declaratory of their constitutional unchangeable-
ness, was a bubble and a fraud.
"Mr. Justice Hotham observes, that, even an Act of Parliament
made against natural equity is void in itself, for the laws of
Nature are immutable, and leges legum, that is, they are laws that
govern the law; an expression equivalent to saying, 'The Consti-
tution is a law to the Legislature, which it must not disobey.'
"Plowden, in pp. 398-400, has reported a variety of cases,
wherein Acts of Parliament were esteemed void in Laz, through
the want of Truth in their recitals.
"The last authority, as well as that of Dyer, ranks high; for
Coke, in his preface to his 2d vol. of Reports, says, 'To the former
Reports you may add the exquisite and elaborate Commentaries
of Master Plowden, a grave man and singularly well-learned; and
the summary and fruitful observations of that famous and most
reverend Judge, Sir J. Dyer, Knight, late Chief justice of the
Common Pleas.'
"For effectually illustrating the duty of firmly resisting error or
corruption, or arbitrary power, under the cloak of Law, it is con-
venient to put a strong case. Thus, in the case of murder,
Blackstone says, 'If any human Law should allow or enjoin us
to commit it, we are bound to transgress that human Law, or
else we must offend both the natural and the divine.' 4
14 Blackstone's Commentaries, Vol. 1, p. 42, Christian's Ed., Lond.
1793.
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"It being obvious that Laws in violation of inherent Rights, or
in subversion of sacred Liberties, do alike offend against the
'natural and divine Law', as laws against life itself; it follows,
that we are alike bound to disobey and resist all such violations
and subversions.
"The Prince of Orange, in his celebrated Declaration prelusive
to his entering England, laid great stress on the Courts of Law
having been wickedly perverted to answer the purposes of
tyranny, and, on the insufferable oppressions of the People in
consequence thereof, expressly declared that none were bound to
acknowledge or obey the Judgments of the wicked judges of
that day, as being. equally with spurious statutes, null and void in
themselves, or. to keep to his own words, 'of no force and
efficacy.' "15
In the American Colonies the foregoing limitations on the
legislative power were supplemented by the limitations imposed
by the American Charters. "Questions sometimes arose -"::* .'
whether the statutes made by these assemblies were in excess of
the powers conferred by the Charter; and if the statutes were
found in excess. they were held invalid by the courts,-that is to
say, in the first instance, by the colonial courts, or, if the Matter
was carried to England, by the 1'rivy Council."'" I take it the,-e
authorities abundantly show that the courts of England did annul
legislation violative of Alagna Charta, natural justice, or other
fundamental restrictions on the legislative authority, such as the
charters which preceded and stood in lieu of our present consti-
tutions.
LUnder the newly organized States these examples were fol-
lowed.'
Mr. Roe says some things upon free speech in relation to criti-
cism of our judiciary which needs emphasis in some parts and
criticism in others. In suggesting the recall of Judges as a useful
remedy he uses this language: "This means discussion and free-
dom for discussion. It means that judicial decisions shall be
'-John Cartwright. The English Constitution Produced and Illus-
trated, pp. 129-136; Ed. of 1823.
36 Bryce,. The American Commonwealth, v. 1, pp. 243-415.
"7 Trevett v. Needen, R. T., (1786) ; Bayard v. Singleton. Martin (N.
C.), p. 48 (1787). For extended discussion see Taylor. Jurisdiction and
Procedure of the Supreme Court of the United States. pp. 2-5: Cooley.
Constitutional Limitations, 36 N. 1.
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subjected to the same public scrutiny that is applied to the votes
and speeches of members of Congress or other legislatures. * * *
Respect for courts and obedience to their decrees must rest upon
some other basis than a fear of contempt proceedings, on a vener-
ation for Judicial mystery. The judge who mistakes damage to
his vanity for an injury to public welfare proves his unfitness for
public office. * * * That the process of contempt is used to violate
the fundamental guaranties of freedom of speech and of the press
is freely charged, and it certainly is subject to great abuse."',
In this connection Mr. Roe (pp. 5 and 199) makes a review of
an interesting case1" as to some extent illustrating the Judicial
abuses of the power to punish contempt. Mr. Roe follows his
judicious comment on the Thatcher Case with this statement: "If
the courts do not speedily abandon the practice of punishing,
under the guise of contempt proceedings, those who have merely
incurred the displeasure of the judges, the Congress and State
legislatures are likely to take the whole matter in hand and regu-
late the subject by statute and see to it that there shall be the same
right to discuss the acts and abilities of judges that obtains in the
case of other public servants."
If Mr. Roe had looked more deeply into the machinations of
our "Judicial Oligarchy" he might have found that it brooks no
interference with its regal "prerogatives". Statutes which pre-
clude courts from exercising the common-law arbitrary power to
punish critics have been held unconstitutional in several States.
2
0
In this respect our "Judicial Oligarchy" is even worse than Mr.
Roe dreamed.
To certain blind-as-bats reformers, Mr. Roe, after elaborate
argument, makes this summary: "The real basis of complaint is
not that judges haven't enough power, but that they have too
much; it is not so much that litigation is costly as that its results
18 The growth of Judicial Despotism, Twentieth Century, July, 1910;
The Growing Despotism of Our Judiciary, The Arena, July, 1908; The
Law of Constructive Contempt, by John L. Thomas, St. Louis, 1904.
1In re Thatcher, 80 Ohio State, 492; 83 Ohio State, 246; 89 North-
eastern Reporter, 39.
20State v. Morrill, 16 Arkansas, 384; State v. Frew, 24 W. V., 416;
Bradley v. State, 50 L. R. A., 691; Cont. v. Carter, 45 L. R. A., 310; State
ex inf. Crow v. Shephard, 177 Mo., 79, 76 S. W., 79, 99 Am. State Rep.,
624. For a good criticism of this last decision see, "The Law of Construc-
tive Contempt," by John L. Thomas. The above cases were recently fol-
lowed in Pennsylvania in a case now pending on appeal.
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are unsatisfactory; it is not that justice is delayed, but that it is
denied. The purpose of the courts should not be so much to
render speedy decisions as to give just judgments.
"Limiting the right to appeal may conceal these wrongs, but it
will not correct them. Greater haste in judicial action will
hardly contribute to a wiser or more just result. -More arbitrary
power vested in a judge may decrease the number of cases in
which he can be reversed but it will not make his wrong decisions
right. It will only increase the number of wrong decisions and
take away the possibility of correcting them."
In interpreting this language, by which our author clarifies the
issues, it is necessary to remember that Mr. Roe is concerning
himself primarily with social justice in the broader sense, where
the judge's theories of economics, and politics and his class preju-
dices are involved and as he proves, are controlling. Thus con-
strued and so far, it is my opinion that he has proven that our
courts are a failure. This brings him to the recall of judges as a
remedy for the ills set forth. The superficial source of the evil
complained of, he points out in the same paragraph by which he
answers one criticism of the recall theory. He says:
"The other half of the argument against the recall of judges,
namely that the possession of such power by the people will intimi-
date the courts into making wrong decisions, has, if possible, less
to support it than that already considered, and is, besides, the
severest arraignment ever made of the judiciary of this country.
If it is true that judges will serve the power that controls the
tenure of their office to the extent of rendering wrong decisions
when that power is the people, is it not true that they will be
equally subservient to any other power which controls their
official life ?" That other power, at present, is the "big interests"
who are the chief beneficiaries of legalized injustice and vested
wrongs, and which are the "invisible government" behind the boss
and the political machine of ill fame.
Ti'fr. Roe fails to mention that to have the "invisible govern-
ment" by big business control the appointment for life, and the
promotion of such judges, because it is beyond undoing, is even
more pernicious than that same control of judges elected for short
periods.
By an abundance of recent discussion it is made very plain .that
the consciously corrupt judge is too infrequent to be half as dan-
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gerous as the conscientious judge, who acquired his judicial pre-
dispositions through the sympathies instilled by a corporation
practice and other schools of privilege. The consciously corrupt
judge. has a corrupted motive in but few cases, while the judge
conscientiously predisposed to favor privileged classes carries that
predisposition into every case by him considered. The conscien-
tious judge who believes in class privileges and undemocratic dis-
tinctions is therefore more pernicious than the judge who is occa-
sionally corrupt. It is precisely these conscientious judges who
most zealously block the progress of our ever refining sense of
social justice, and by the blind following of ancient precedents,
they seem to sanctify their wrongs. To my mind it is plain that
the true cause of complaint is not so mcuh that a power exists to
declare laws unconstitutional, as the manner in which that power
has been exercised.
This brings me to another question, and I think the most impor-
tant question connected with this controversy and one which has
been neither asked nor answered. Why is it that a corporation-
bred lawyer quite uniformly remains an unconscious corporation
attorney while performing judicial functions. I am convinced
that only a small percentage are justly chargeable with conscious
dishonesty, even of the kind which is merely intellectual. Why
is the conscientious judge unable to get away from those early
sympathies first excited by his youthful cupidity? And why, in
spite of his efforts to be just, does he nearly always see legal
problems through the eyes of the privileged classes? That he
does this is what Mr. Roe and others prove quite clearly.
Candidly; I believe the answer to my questions is this: Our
judges are at least so far intellectual bankrupts as to have little
or no social consciousness2 ' and minds utterly devoid of anything
like a scientific conception of law, or any knowledges of what is
meant by a scientific method for the ascertainment of truth.
Elsewhere I have undertaken to indicate the requirements of the
scientific method as applied to law."2 A conscious and intelligent
application of the scientific method would preclude practically all
the evils complained of, and nothing else can give us relief. So
long as our judicial opinions are formed by the mental processes
21 1 use these words as they are defined in Prof. Fite's "Individualism."
22 Interstate Commerce, Employer's Liability and the Supreme Court,
in Government, June, 1908, and American Law Riecu, Jane,, 1908.
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of the intellectual bankrupts these will only be crude justifications
of predispositions acquired through personal or class interests and
sympathy, "moral" superstitions, or whim and caprice. It fol-
lows that courts decide cases without declaring or applying "law",
in any scientific sense, because they misuse empirical inductions
and stupid dogmas for legal principles, and often times they even
mistake a figure of speech for an anology, or an illustration for
argument. Thus from incompetence courts produce unsatisfac-
tory results. A like incompetence among critics makes them
misconceive the issues and misdirect their criticism. Thus it
comes that we hear so much uncritical criticism of the courts for
technical devisions. The unintelligent critic sees the effect of
the technicality only as it produces results contrary to his pre-
dispositioris, usually founded only on sympathies and blind emo-
tions. Ordinarily, I think, a wider vision would enable them to
see the "technicality" as but a special application of a general prin-
ciple which it is important to maintain inviolate for the sake of
uniformity in the rules which shall govern human conduct and
liberty. It is this like incapacity which recently prompted the
demand, from an influential source, that laymen shall be put upon
our appellate benches in order that "equity" and "justice between
man and man" may prevail.
Such suggestions for the reform of our judiciary come from
laymen, and evidence the same kind of intellectual bankruptcy,
which so frequently induces appellate courts to affirm judgments
because "substantial justice" has been done, which they judge to
be the fact in spite of the disregard of those general principles
and axioms by which the best minds sought to preclude injustice.
In this aspect some reforms resolve themselves into mere stupid
suggestion from one group of incompetents for the reform of
others, whose faults also are due to incompetence of a lesser
degree. The proposed remedy is but more of the disease.
Such reformers see every controversy as an isolated phenomenon,
because they are unable to think in generalizations, and so see no
relation of principle between different cases. This same inca-
pacity for co~irdination makes these critics and many judges
unable to see that uniformity, generality and certainty in all the
state-enforced rules of conduct, is the most important safeguard
against despotism. Take away the demand that judicial decisions
shall conform to general principles, and then you destroy the best
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method by which corrupt motive.§ can be dete4ed and perniciots
despoti.sm curtailed,
-"To have no rule of dividing controyersies, hut only the rule o
mere equity, is to begin the world again; to makle choi@e of that.
rule, which out of mre tpressity Wgs mAde u§@ of, in the i nfancy
of the state; and inligency of laws and now is the only r4lp
among Indians and Hottentots in Africa; and to set up this rule;
after laws Are established, and leave the matter at large, is it not
rather unravelling, by unperceived degrees, the fine and close te -
ture of the law of Fingland, which has been for so many hundred
yearg making? And which made a noble lord and a great and
learned :hancellor say OnEs "if quity were too much encouraged,
it would in time e-at out thP heart of the common law of
England,"2
'FrEedom of nen under government is to havE a §tanding rlllg
to live by common to every one of that socity and made by the
egislastive power erected in it a liherty to follow my own will
in all things where the rule presprihe not: and not to be sj.ho
to the inon.stant, uncertain, pnknowp, arbitrary will-qf another
"The discretiop of a judge is the law of tyrants; it is alwa ys
unk nown; it is casual, and depends upon constitution, tem pr
passion, In the best, it is oft times caprice; in the worst is e ery
vice, folly And passion to which human n ature is liable."
23
To the Etent of believing that the highest ideal of right gan
only be attained through the gentwral application of fixed, uniform
and certAin principles, I am in acord with the opponents of the
recall of judges And of judicial opinions: I have alFady
e4plained that owing to a want of intelligenPe As to the centifie
method, my Conviction is that at pre@§ent we haye such uniformity
and certainty only to a very limited extent and thepn uutlly hy
accident, rather than as a res@ of conscious§ design.
It is difficult to find a modern judicial opinion whiph oiye@
evidence that our jud&ge have mor@ than a bqdding consciqun@e§..
of the _scentific method or use of sy§tematized endeavor in their
intellctual ac-tivitis? All i4 the crudest kind of empiricism 1vith
?. 4Frtesce's Pefgpe to his "Reports", p. III-IV.
24Locke here requoted from "Observations On the Nature of Civil
Liberty", by Richard Hay, p. 37-38.
25Lord Camden, requoted from Russell's Eng. Const., 241.
SOCIAL JUSTICE AND THE COURTS
a manifest unconsciousness of the nature, or even of the existence
of a scientific method.
In consequence of this I do not believe that the recall will make
matters any worse, but rather better, because it will perhaps
impress the judges at times with the necessity of doing a little
more careful thinking and inquiring if their reasoning will seem
to others justified-is it justified? I can perhaps illustrate what
I mean by repeating a statement I often heard among lawyers in
the middle west. It was said that anybody would do as a justice
of the court of last resort because he had the last guess, but it
required a superior lawyer to make a creditable record as a justice
of the peace.
When I read the extravagant prophecies of disaster which are
to follow if judges in their official conduct are made as dependent
as the legislators, I refuse to be frightened, because all those
threats of disaster were made when it was first proposed to
"destroy the independency of parliament" in England, by making
its members responsible to the electorate, and "degrading" these
officials by-having them appeal for votes on definite programs for
legislation. When I read the equally extravagant promises made
by advocates of the recall, I also refuse to be impressed, because
I see that for a century our legislators have been just as subser-
vient to the money-power as were the members of England's
parliament when they were not making "appeals to the rabble."
No! The recall will do neither the harm nor the good that is
prophesied, but it is coming. It is coming because it is in line
with the slowly progressing democratization of human institutions
and therefore right. What good it will do will not be of the kind
prophesied, but will come by indirection. It will tend to make
judges more thoughtful and give voters an interest and oppor-
tunity for more enlightenment as to their relations to their fellow
men. As an educational force slowly and in the long run it will
do good, and in my judgment aside from this it will do little of
either good or harm.
Theodore Schroeder.
New York City.
